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Early childhood educational investment produces positive effects on cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, health, and socio-economic success. However, the effects of such interven-
tions on social decision-making later in life are unknown. We recalled participants from one
of the oldest randomized controlled studies of early childhood investment—the Abecedarian
Project (ABC)—to participate in well-validated interactive economic games that probe social
norm enforcement and planning. We show that in a repeated-play ultimatum game, ABC
participants who received high-quality early interventions strongly reject unequal division of
money across players (disadvantageous or advantageous) even at signiﬁcant cost to them-
selves. Using a multi-round trust game and computational modeling of social exchange, we
show that the same intervention participants also plan further into the future. These ﬁndings
suggest that high quality early childhood investment can result in long-term changes in social
decision-making and promote social norm enforcement in order to reap future beneﬁts.
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Early childhood investment improves the development ofdisadvantaged children through affecting a variety of cog-nitive and non-cognitive skills, often translating into better
outcomes during adulthood1–3. The Abecedarian Project (ABC)
—one of the world’s oldest high-quality experiments of early
childhood intervention—enrolled newborns from low-income,
multi-risk families in Orange County, North Carolina, between
1972 and 1977, and provided intensive early childhood education
intervention from the ﬁrst few months of life until school entry.
Follow-up studies have provided mounting evidence for positive
cognitive4, educational5, economic6, and physical health7 out-
comes into adulthood for participants who were exposed to this
intervention. However, possible effects of early childhood inter-
ventions on social decision-making strategies have not yet been
investigated in this population. This is an important issue as
certain social decision-making strategies could beneﬁt an indivi-
dual, including later ﬁnancial, educational, social, and health
outcomes. One such strategy is to choose actions that enforce
social norms such as equality. Social norm enforcement, which
often entails a cost8, is thought to be motivated by the fact that it
can result in long-term positive effects on cooperation9 and thus
lead to future beneﬁt—outweighing the immediate cost—for the
individual. Since the development of social decision-making styles
can be traced back to early childhood10,11, it is therefore essential
to investigate if early childhood intervention can impact social
decision-making later in adulthood. In the current study, we used
two economic games to probe decision-making during social
interactions in ABC participants at ages 39–45: the ultimatum
game (UG) particularly effective at measuring enforcement of
social norms of equality and fairness12 and the multi-round trust
game (MRT) measuring the process of cooperation forming/
rupture through iterated social exchanges13,14.
In the UG aimed at probing social decision-making related to
norm enforcement, one player (Proposer) has to decide how to
split a sum of money with another player (Responder). The
Responder’s acceptance results in each party receiving the allo-
cated money whereas rejection results in both receiving no
money15. The UG builds a context in which players have to make
trade-offs between self-interest and social norms of equality—
rejections being a way to punish behaviors that transgress such
social norms16. A prominent hypothesis for explaining such
behavior is the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion model, which
proposes that people use a utility function that expresses pre-
ferences for equality and away from inequality, in both dis-
advantageous (i.e., Responder gets less than the Proposer) and
advantageous (i.e., Responder gets more than the Proposer)
situations17. The Fehr–Schmidt model is consistent with the fact
that rejection of disadvantageous (low) offers has been con-
sistently observed across studies15,18. However, behavior towards
advantageous offers is more variable19–21. A recent study found
participants rejected both disadvantageous and advantageous
offers more than equal offers when playing the UG as a third
party not involved in the distributive outcome. In contrast, when
playing as Responders whose own beneﬁt was affected by their
choices, these same participants did not reject advantageous offers
more than equal offers22. This ﬁnding suggests that even if
individuals aspire to promote and enforce an “equal world”, self-
interest can often overcome inequality aversion.
The UG focuses on equality, but ignores strategic considerations
that arise when repeatedly interacting with the same player. These
involve planning over multiple rounds, along with the necessity of
characterizing one’s partners and modeling the iterative exchange.
To examine this, each participant also played an MRT of 10 rounds
with the same partner. In each round, one player (Investor) received
$20 and had to choose to invest any portion of it. This amount of
money was tripled and sent to the other player (Trustee) who
decided how much of it to repay the Investor13. A recent model of
preference and mental states has provided a quantitative way to
model behavior during this task23. This model assumes that players
compute the long-run utilities of the available options to guide
decisions24 and it allows us to investigate both immediate reactions
such as inequality aversion and their capacity to plan ahead—
operationalized by the model’s planning horizon. The planning
horizon is important since failing to plan ahead during a social
exchange can lead to a rupture in cooperation14.
In this study we showcase how combining economic games
with sophisticated computational models of behavior can provide
sensitive indicators to assess the long-term effects—more than 40
years later—of early educational interventions on social decision-
making. With this ecological approach, as we show next, such
intervention can result in long-term changes in social decision-
making and promote social norm enforcement possibly for the
consideration of future beneﬁts.
Results
ABC project overview. The ABC project was conducted with
children from low-income families in the 1970s (see Supplemen-
tary Materials in ref. 7 for details). It was designed to examine the
impact of intensive early childhood education on preventing
developmental delays and academic failure. One hundred and
twenty families were recruited in the ABC Project with Scores of
High Risk Index25 as eligibility criteria (infants with a score
higher than 11 were eligible4). Enrolled families were paired on
High Risk Index scores and then one family from each pair was
randomly assigned to either the intervention or the control group.
The base sample included 111 children from 109 families that
accepted their randomization assignment and accepted to parti-
cipate (one family with a pair of twins and another with a pair of
siblings). Among them, 57 were assigned to the intervention
group; the other 54 to the control group. At the preschool stage
(from 2 months to 5 years of life), for both intervention and
control groups, a standard intervention including nutritional,
health care, and family social support services was given, while
the intervention group received an extra educational intervention.
The educational intervention included cognitive and social sti-
mulation, caregiving, and supervised play throughout a full 8-h
day (5 days per week, 50 weeks per year) during the ﬁrst 5 years,
emphasizing language, emotional regulation, and cognitive skill
development26,27. This intervention employed a curriculum
including a series of “educational games” developed by Sparling
and Lewis26. Each teacher was in charge of child care for three
infants, which ensured intensive interactions between children
and teachers. In addition, the intervention group was also pro-
vided with free primary pediatric care and nutrition, including
routine screenings, immunizations, pediatric care staff visits, and
laboratory tests. Another randomization was implemented when
children entered schools when they were ﬁve years old, with
about half of the children in the intervention or control group
during the preschool stage assigned to another three-year
intervention28,29. Analyses in the current paper focused on the
outcomes for intervention in the preschool phase, irrespective of
the assignments at the school-age stage5.
From the original 111 ABC participants, 78 took part in the
current study, 36 (ABC Controls) received basic supports (i.e.,
nutritional, health care, and family social support services) from
birth to age 5, while 42 (ABC Interventions) received these
supports along with a 5-year, high-quality educational interven-
tion focusing on cognition and social–emotional development
(see Table 1 and Supplementary Table 1 showing attrition was
comparable in both groups). We also tested an independent
control group of 252 adults (Roanoke Controls) recruited from
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Roanoke, Virginia, who did not receive any controlled interven-
tion in early childhood.
Stronger norm enforcement in ABC Interventions in UG. Our
participants played 60 rounds of UG as the Responder deciding
whether to accept or reject offers about how to split $20 with
different Proposers (Fig. 1a). Unknown to the participants, offers
were generated by a computer algorithm which selected the offers
from three different truncated Gaussian distributions: Low offers
(mean= $4), Medium offers (mean= $8), or High offers (mean
= $12), each with a standard deviation= $1.5. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of two conditioning types: the medium-
high–medium (MHM) type and the medium-low–medium
(MLM) type. During the ﬁrst 20 rounds, both types received
offers taken from the Medium distribution. During the next 20
rounds, the MHM type received offers from the High distribution
while the MLM type received offers taken from the Low dis-
tribution. For the last 20 rounds, both types received offers from
the Medium distribution (Fig. 1a). All participants were asked to
report their emotional reaction towards the current offer from
unhappy to happy on a 1–9 scale in 60% of the rounds. To
examine social behavior towards both disadvantageous and
advantageous inequality, the MHM type was the main focus of
our analysis on rejection rate and emotion rating, since advan-
tageous offers (higher than $10) were rarely displayed in MLM
type (see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2, Supplementary Table 2
and Supplementary Note 1 for results for MLM type).
Using Group (ABC Intervention vs. ABC Control vs. Roanoke
Control) × Equality (Disadvantageous Unequal vs. Equal vs.
Advantageous Unequal) analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) with
Gender as the covariate and Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests,
we found that ABC Controls who underwent the MHM
conditioning type rejected disadvantageous offers (mean ± s.e.
m., 42.7 ± 8.5% of all disadvantageous offers for one participant)
more than equal offers (1.0 ± 1.0%), p < 0.001, but did not reject
advantageous offers (4.5 ± 2.5%) more than equal offers (1.0 ±
1.0%), p= 1.000. This pattern of response is in line with previous
work that reported behavior driven by self-interest in the face of
advantageous offers (i.e., low rejection rates)22,30 and very similar
to the pattern we observed in Roanoke Controls. In stark contrast,
along with rejecting disadvantageous offers (48.3 ± 7.2%), ABC
Interventions (in MHM type) rejected advantageous offers (43.4
± 8.5%) more than equal offers (5.0 ± 2.8%), p’s < 0.001. This
difference in rejection pattern was conﬁrmed by a signiﬁcant
Group × Equality interaction, F(3,258)= 13.464, p < 0.001, η2p=
0.140 (Fig. 2b), and the fact that ABC Interventions rejected
advantageous offers more than ABC Controls (p < 0.001) and
Roanoke Controls (p < 0.001). A signiﬁcant Group × Offer Size
interaction was also found, F(5,411)= 8.229, p < 0.001, η2p=
0.090 (see Supplementary Note 2 for details). In keeping with this,
only the ABC Interventions showed a “V shape” rejection rate
pattern, with rejection increasing as a function of inequality,
regardless of whether the inequality was personally advantageous
or disadvantageous (Fig. 2c and Table 2). Since rejecting offers in
the UG is akin to punishing the Proposer31, this rejection pattern
can be considered a strong social signal aimed at enforcing
equality during exchanges.
Taking advantage of behavioral modeling, we also estimated
individual sensitivity to advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality in the UG using the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion
utility function17 where the utility of an offer is discounted by
“envy” (unwillingness to accept disadvantageous offer) and
“guilt” (unwillingness to accept advantageous offers). In line
with our rejection rate results, an ANCOVA with Gender as the
covariate and Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests found that
while ABC Interventions had similar envy coefﬁcients as ABC
Controls (p= 1.000), they had higher guilt coefﬁcients than both
ABC Controls (p < 0.001) and Roanoke Controls (p < 0.001)
(Fig. 2d), suggesting heightened sensitivity to advantageous
inequality (see Supplementary Note 3 for details). Furthermore,
the similar envy and guilt coefﬁcients in ABC Interventions
Table 1 Participant retention and attrition
Intervention Female Intervention Male Control Female Control Male
Followed Attritted Followed Attritted Followed Attritted Followed Attritted
Initial enrollment (N) 28 0 29 0 31 0 23 0
Fifth decade (N) 24 4 26 3 26 5 19 4
Behavior analysis
(N) 20 8 22 7 21 10 15 8
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Fig. 1 The ultimatum game (UG) and multi-round trust game (MRT) in the
current study. a Procedure for UG comprising of 60 rounds, with Mean and
SD of offer size in each round across Medium-Low-Medium (MLM) or
Medium-High-Medium (MHM) conditioning type. Each participant was
told he/she was the Responder in this game who decided to accept or
reject the offer (s) from different Proposers in each round. Offers were
sampled from one of the three Gaussian distributions: low offers (mean $4,
SD $1.5); medium offers (mean $8, SD $1.5); and high offers (mean $12, SD
$1.5). b Procedure for MRT comprising 10 consecutive rounds. Participants
were told that they, as the Investor, were playing with the same Trustee
across the whole game. In each round, the participant received $20 and
decided how much of it to send to the Trustee. This amount of money (I)
received by the Trustee was tripled (3*I) and any portion of it was then
repaid to the investor (R*3*I). SD standard deviation
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suggest that, as a group, they displayed a unique symmetric
disutility for advantageous and disadvantageous offers which is in
accordance with their “V shape” rejection pattern (Fig. 2e).
Finally, when asked to report their feelings towards the offers,
only ABC Interventions rated equal offers as more pleasant than
both advantageous and disadvantageous offers (p’s < 0.001),
consistent with symmetric sensitivity to inequality and the “V
shape” rejection pattern (Fig. 3 and Table 3). Overall, these results
suggest that an early childhood intervention program can
profoundly alter sensitivity to norm deviation in adulthood and
promote social norm enforcement.
ABC Interventions planned further into future in MRT. In the
MRT, two players—an Investor and a Trustee—engage in 10
rounds of economic exchange game. In the current study, each
participant played 10 consecutive rounds as the Investor (Fig. 1b).
A model based on interactive partially observable Markov deci-
sion processes32 (iPOMDP) was used to characterize preference
and mental states during social interaction within the MRT. The
model assumes that players compute the long-run utilities (called
Q-values) of the available options to guide decisions24. A self-
consistency condition for the Q-values over successive rounds is
prescribed by the Bellman equation33. Based on extensive vali-
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Fig. 2 Offer distribution, rejection rates, and model-based parameters in the ultimatum game. a Distribution of offer size for Medium-High-Medium
(MHM) conditioning type. The frequency is the average occurrence for each offer size across participants in MHM. b Rejection rates for MHM grouped by
level of equality. All groups had higher rejection rates for disadvantageous offers than equal offers. Advantageous offers were not rejected more than equal
offers in ABC Control and Roanoke Control, while ABC Interventions rejected advantageous offers more than equal offers. c Rejection rates for MHM
grouped by offer size. Only ABC Interventions increased rejection rates as a function of inequality, regardless of them being personally advantageous or
disadvantageous, presenting a “V shape” pattern. d Parameter estimates from the behavioral modeling using a Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion model.
Both ABC Interventions and ABC Controls have a higher level of envy (unwillingness to accept unequal offers which are disadvantageous to the participant)
than Roanoke Controls. The ABC Interventions had a higher guilt (unwillingness to accept unequal offers which are advantageous to the participant) than
ABC Controls and Roanoke Controls. e The horizontal axis presents different levels of equality: DU disadvantageous unequal, E equal, AU advantageous
unequal. The vertical axis presents the disutility deﬁned by the inequality aversion (IA) model (i.e., sensitivity × inequality). The slope of each line presents
the sensitivity for inequality aversion (IA; envy for DU and guilt for AU). A steeper slope corresponds to higher inequality aversion. Compared with the
control groups, ABC Interventions presented a much more symmetric IA pattern (i.e., the same level of envy and guilt). Shaded areas are bounded by mean
± s.e.m. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001 (post hoc t-test p-values). Error bar represents s.e.m.
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dation23, this model has two structural characteristics. First, since
the value of a player’s action depends on the future decisions of
the partner, players are assumed to develop a model of their
partners—which assumes players have distinct levels of theory of
mind and follow a cognitive hierarchy theory34. Speciﬁcally, a
player of type k assumes that the partner has type k-1. Second,
players are assumed to model Q-values only a certain number
(the planning horizon) of rounds into the future, substituting
default values thereafter (Fig. 4a).
We ﬁrst assessed possible group difference with one-way
analyses of variance on overall behavior (fractional investments)
and performance (total earnings) across the MRT. Average
fractional investments were similar across groups, F(2,327)=
2.488, p= 0.085, η2p= 0.015 (ABC Interventions, 50.6 ± 3.2%;
ABC Controls, 45.9 ± 3.2%; Roanoke Controls, 54.5 ± 1.5%). The
total earnings were also not different among groups, F(2,327)=
2.443, p= 0.088, η2p= 0.015 (ABC Interventions, 215.67 ± 6.02;
ABC Controls, 210.5 ± 7.60; Roanoke Controls, 225.07 ± 2.68).
However, using model-based analysis, we were able to highlight
group differences in decision-making strategies, with ABC
Interventions having a higher level of planning horizon compared
to Roanoke Controls and a lower level of ToM compared to ABC
Controls. To be more speciﬁc, with independent-samples
Kruskal–Wallis H-test and the follow-up two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U-tests, we found a signiﬁcant main effect of group
for planning horizon, H(2)= 6.849, p= 0.033, with ABC
Interventions (2.45 ± 0.17) having a higher level of planning
horizon than Roanoke Controls (2.01 ± 0.07, Bonferroni cor-
rected p= 0.027) but not signiﬁcantly different from ABC
Controls (2.08 ± 0.20, Bonferroni-corrected p= 0.269) (Fig. 4b).
This result suggests that social decision-making in ABC
Interventions, compared to Roanoke Controls, seems to be
particularly inﬂuenced by future and long-term outcomes. The
main effect of group was also found to be signiﬁcant for theory of
mind (ToM), H(2)= 6.701, p= 0.035, with ABC Controls (2.83
± 0.24) having a higher level of ToM than ABC Interventions
(2.05 ± 0.24, Bonferroni-corrected p= 0.047) but not different
from Roanoke Controls (2.62 ± 0.09, Bonferroni corrected p=
0.974), suggesting that ABC Controls might have adopted a
different social decision-making strategy (i.e., modeling the other)
compared to ABC Interventions’ strategy (i.e., planning ahead).
See Supplementary Note 4 for details about other parameters in
this model.
Discussion
The ABC project and its follow-up studies have shown that early
childhood intervention can result in short- and long-term effects
including important and substantial cognitive, health, and edu-
cational beneﬁts5,7,29. In line with these results, now over 40 years
after, ABC Interventions in the current study, compared to ABC
Controls, reported higher levels of “very close” relationships with
their parents (85.7% vs. 58.3%, p < 0.001), higher levels of educa-
tional attainment (97.6% vs. 75.0% completed high school, p <
0.001 and had four times the rate of college graduation), and
more of them had saving accounts (92.9% vs. 66.7%, p < 0.001)
(see Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Note 5 for
midlife demographic information). These real-life outcomes
might proﬁt greatly from the ability to attend to social norms,
establish and maintain positive social interactions, and plan into
the future, which are dynamic and complex processes related to
social decision-making.
The current study revealed a boost in social norm enforcement
behaviors and sensitivity to social norm violation in middle-age
adults from the ABC project who received a high-quality edu-
cational intervention during the ﬁrst 5 years of their lives. Playing
the role of the Responder in an UG, these individuals rejected
unequal offers more than equal offers regardless of whether the
split was disadvantageous or advantageous to them—displaying
symmetric inequality aversion. Since rejecting the offers of the
Proposers in the UG is akin to punishing the Proposer31, this
rejection pattern can be considered as a strong social signal aimed
at enforcing equality during social exchanges. Indeed, a study
investigating the motivations of rejecting advantageous offers by
analyzing verbal data during the discussion between pairs of
players in the UG21 found that most participants claimed to
enforce the norm of equality when they rejected offers that were
advantageous to them.
Our results revealed that ABC Interventions rejected advan-
tageous offers more than the two control groups while both ABC
Interventions and ABC Controls rejected disadvantageous offers
more than Roanoke Controls. This result for disadvantageous
offers could be related to differences between the ABC and
Roanoke samples: ABC groups had much more experience with
psychological testing than the Roanoke group, ABC participants
are African-American while the Roanoke Controls are more
racially diverse, and the samples grew up in different states
(North Carolina vs. Virginia). However, the amount of testing in
the follow-up studies of the ABC project was equivalent between
ABC Interventions and ABC Controls, and importantly, neither
the intervention nor the follow-up tests involved economics
games such as the UG (or MRT) for either ABC group. Hence the
higher rejection rate on advantageous offers compared to the two
control groups and the unique symmetric inequality aversion of
ABC Intervention is more likely driven by the effects of the
educational intervention during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of their lives.
We note that these differences are based on a relatively small
sample which might raise the possibility of it being a false posi-
tive. However, the amount of convergent evidence, including the
unique V shape rejection rate pattern of ABC Interventions, the
group difference on model-based parameters and the corre-
sponding emotion rating patterns, suggests that our result of a
Table 2 Rejection rates between offer sizes in Medium-
High-Medium conditioning type
Offer size Rejection rate (mean ± s.e.m.) Comparison Difference
ABC Intervention
offers < 8 64.9 ± 8.4% > offers= 8 p= 0.003
offers= 8 42.2 ± 8.6% > offers= 9 p < 0.001
offers= 9 21.3 ± 6.2% > offers= 10 p= 0.003
offers= 10 5.0 ± 2.8% < offers= 11 p < 0.001
offers= 11 25.2 ± 7.9% < offers= 12 p < 0.001
offers= 12 44.1 ± 9.4% < offers > 12 p= 0.002
offers > 12 54.5 ± 9.7% – – –
ABC Control
offers < 8 62.0 ± 9.6% > offers= 8 p= 0.014
offers= 8 34.7 ± 10.9% n.s. offers= 9 p= 0.118
offers= 9 20.8 ± 8.6% > offers= 10 p= 0.006
offers= 10 1.0 ± 1. 0% n.s. offers= 11 p= 1.000
offers= 11 1.1 ± 1.1% n.s. offers= 12 p= 1.000
offers= 12 3.0 ± 2.1% n.s. offers > 12 p= 1.000
offers > 12 8.8 ± 5.5% – – –
Roanoke Control
offers < 8 36.7 ± 3.4% > offers= 8 p < 0.001
offers= 8 12.8 ± 2.2% > offers= 9 p= 0.001
offers= 9 5.6 ± 1.3% n.s. offers= 10 p= 0.233
offers= 10 1.0 ± 0.6% n.s. offers= 11 p= 1.000
offers= 11 2.5 ± 1.2% n.s. offers= 12 p= 1.000
offers= 12 0.9 ± 0.8% n.s. offers > 12 p= 1.000
offers > 12 2.3 ± 1.0% – – –
s.e.m. standard error of the mean
n.s. means the difference was not signiﬁcant
P-values were Bonferroni corrected
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difference in equality-based decision-making between ABC
Interventions and Controls is a robust ﬁnding.
When resources are divided unequally, people typically exhibit
norm enforcement in which they punish the person responsible
for the unequal split, even at a cost35. However, self-interest often
overweighs the willingness to enforce this social norm22—
unequal splits that are advantageous are less punished than dis-
advantageous ones30. Indeed, contrary to ABC Interventions who
showed symmetric inequality aversion, our two control groups
were unwilling to forgo the possibility of enjoying the personal
beneﬁts of advantageous offers which they rarely rejected. This
important difference suggests that early educational interventions
—in this case, for children from deeply impoverished back-
grounds—can contribute to stronger norm enforcement during
social exchanges in adulthood. Our results are in line with recent
ﬁndings from another early childhood education program
showing that preschool education made children more egalitarian
at 7–8 years old36. Importantly, our results demonstrate that such
changes can extend into adulthood—many decades after the
intervention. It was recently shown that disadvantaged children
whose mothers are more prosocial (measured by higher levels of
altruism, trust, and other-regarding preference) had a higher
increase in prosociality after receiving interventions that enriched
their social environment37. Our results, showing that early
investment in children can inﬂuence social decision-making (i.e.,
higher other-regarding and inequality-aversive in terms of
monetary distribution) during adulthood thus suggest that facil-
itating prosociality behavior through early childhood investments
could have a cascading effect—through intergenerational trans-
mission—by potentializing the impacts of subsequent interven-
tions in future generations. It is notable that the effect found in
the current study may be relatively restricted in terms of its
translation to everyday behaviors. It would be interesting to look
in future work at commonplace measures that are closely related
to inequality (such as charitable giving) in order to see if our
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offers as less pleasant than equal offers but advantageous offers as more pleasant than equal offers. b Emotion rating across 60 rounds in MHM grouped
by offer size. ABC Interventions rated equal offer as more pleasant than each disadvantageous offer as well as than each advantageous unequal offer, while
ABC Controls decreased emotion rating for more disadvantageous offers but reported no difference between equal and advantageous offers. Compared
with ABC Controls and Roanoke Controls, ABC Interventions rated each advantageous offer as signiﬁcantly less pleasant. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.001 (post hoc
t-test p-values). Error bar represents s.e.m.
Table 3 Emotion ratings between offer sizes in Medium-
High-Medium conditioning type
Offer size Emotion ratings (mean ± s.e.m.) Comparison Difference
ABC Intervention
offers < 8 4.5 ± 0.4 < offers= 8 p= 0.027
offers= 8 5.0 ± 0.4 < offers= 9 p= 0.004
offers= 9 5.5 ± 0.4 < offers= 10 p < 0.001
offers= 10 8.1 ± 0.3 > offers= 11 p < 0.001
offers= 11 6.1 ± 0.4 n.s. offers= 12 p= 1.000
offers= 12 5.9 ± 0.4 n.s. offers > 12 p= 1.000
offers > 12 5.6 ± 0.5 – – –
ABC Control
offers < 8 4.0 ± 0.5 < offers= 8 p < 0.001
offers= 8 4.9 ± 0.3 n.s. offers= 9 p= 0.874
offers= 9 5.3 ± 0.3 < offers= 10 p < 0.001
offers= 10 7.6 ± 0.3 n.s. offers= 11 p= 1.000
offers= 11 7.6 ± 0.3 n.s. offers= 12 p= 1.000
offers= 12 7.7 ± 0.3 n.s. offers > 12 p= 1.000
offers > 12 7.8 ± 0.4 – – –
Roanoke Control
offers < 8 3.6 ± 0.1 < offers= 8 p < 0.001
offers= 8 4.8 ± 0.1 < offers= 9 p < 0.001
offers= 9 5.5 ± 0.1 < offers= 10 p < 0.001
offers= 10 7.0 ± 0.1 n.s. offers= 11 p= 1.000
offers= 11 7.2 ± 0.1 < offers= 12 p < 0.001
offers= 12 7.5 ± 0.1 n.s. offers > 12 p= 1.000
offers > 12 7.6 ± 0.1 – – –
s.e.m. standard error of the mean
n.s. means the difference was not signiﬁcant
P-values were Bonferroni corrected
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laboratory ﬁndings are paralleled by social decision-making in
their daily life.
In the MRT, additionally, although no differences were found
on overall investment and performance between groups, using
computational modeling we were able to highlight differences in
social decision-making strategies. On the one hand, we observed
that ABC Interventions planned further into the future in the
MRT compared to Roanoke Controls. On the other hand, the
higher ToM parameter for ABC Controls indicated that this
group utilized more mentalization steps than ABC Interventions
during this game. These ﬁndings suggest that the similar overall
behavior of the two ABC groups might be motivated by different
social decision-making strategies. It is possible that ABC Inter-
ventions focused more on future social interactions while ABC
Controls took other’s mental states into more consideration,
potentially indicative of a preference to reap short-term beneﬁts.
These ﬁndings also reveal the advantage of our approach which
provides information about the underlying mechanism (or
strategy) of social decision-making, and thus go beyond the study
of the outcome (or overall behavior) of this process. It would be
important for future studies to examine the role of these under-
lying strategies (e.g., planning horizon and ToM) on social
decision-making using experimental designs. It is notable that
these process-oriented results found in the current study could be
related to actual outcomes of social decision-making (e.g., income
or other economic outcomes;social well-being). Future work on
this would add ecological validity of these process-oriented
ﬁndings.
The striking high rejection of advantageous unequal offers in
the UG in the current study is rare in large-scale societies (but see
in refs. 21,38). However, previous work on participants from
Western cultures found that when people played the UG as a
third party whose personal beneﬁt would not be affected by their
decisions, they also displayed a symmetric inequality aversion22,
which is very similar to what we ﬁnd here in ABC Interventions.
This suggests that such symmetric inequality aversion is indeed
valued by some in Western cultures. Importantly, studies22
including our own have also shown that this social norm is less
enforced when self-interest comes into play, which may explain
why it is rarely observed. The rejection of advantageous offers
also occurs in some small-scale societies where the convention is
to repay an unsolicited gift—high value offers are sometimes
rejected when the Responder does not want to be indebted to the
Proposer39. It raises the possibility that the ABC Interventions in
our study might have a stronger belief in reciprocity so that they
were more alert to potential cost or repayment caused by
advantageous offers in the future, instead of current payoffs. It is
just one possible hypothesis; in the future, it should be tested
using more elaborate methods because of the obvious difference
between these small-scale societies and the culture of our
participants.
The longer planning horizon of the ABC Interventions esti-
mated from the MRT suggests their unique norm enforcement
behavior during the UG may be motivated by such anticipated
future personal costs but also potential social beneﬁts. Consistent
with this interpretation, equality enforcement by punishing
unequal offers was shown to be positively correlated with
altruistic behaviors across cultures40. Indeed, behavior towards
equality and fairness despite short-term cost to self has been
proposed as important in stabilizing long-term cooperation9,41.
Furthermore, ensuring that others comply with social norms can
impact others’ behaviors to create a more cooperative social
environment8, which can produce future societal beneﬁts.
Our approach based on quantitatively prescribed economic
games provides a quantitative indicator evaluating possible social
beneﬁts of early childhood investment programs. By having
participants actively interact with others in social contexts, we
provide a more ecologically valid way to measure outcomes on
b
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Round n
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Fig. 4 The Planning horizon in the multi-round trust game (MRT). a In each round, the Investor (played by the participant; indicated in blue) received $20
and decided how much of it to send to the Trustee (played by a computer algorithm; indicated in black). The amount (I) the Investor sent was tripled and
delivered to the Trustee, who decided what fraction (R) of this total (3*I) to send back to the Investor. The Investor ended up with 20-I+R*3*I; the Trustee
with (1-R)*3*I. Planning horizon quantiﬁes how many steps of the future interactions the participant took into account when assessing the results of his/her
investment during the MRT. b Distribution of the future planning capacity parameter (planning horizon) in ABC Intervention, ABC Control, and Roanoke
Control group, respectively
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social decision-making compared to self-report questionnaires.
Indeed, our ﬁndings contribute unique knowledge about long-
term correlates of receiving a high-quality early education:
changes in social decision-making highlighted by higher social
norm enforcing behavior probably motivated by anticipated
future beneﬁts related to social cooperation. We should hasten to
add that our ﬁndings seem to reveal the effects of the educational
intervention in the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the ABC participants’ life.
However, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility that
these differences are related to other factors that resulted from the
intervention and that occurred during the four decades that fol-
lowed it. Indeed, since our measures were taken at a single time
point (over 40 years after the intervention), known changes on
health7, educational level5, social connections as well as other
factors induced by the intervention may have also played a role in
shaping the participants’ social decision-making pattern. Our
own analyses did not detect an association between adult edu-
cational attainment, for example, and decision-making behavior
in this sample. It would be valuable, nonetheless, to further
investigate if and how early childhood interventions or any
aspects of them can give rise to differences in later experiences
that in turn inﬂuence social decision-making behaviors. By
investing in the early education of highly vulnerable children—
with a program that underscores positive adult–child interactions,
explicitly teaches about cause-and-effect, permits active learning
and early decision-making opportunities, and promotes increas-
ingly complex social cooperation—children realize a brighter
future, becoming healthier7, more productive3, and as our results
show, stronger promoters of the norms on which our society is
built.
Methods
Participants. As mentioned above, the base sample included 111 children. About
four decades after their enrollment, 16 participants attritted with 9 deceased (3
from the intervention group, 6 from the control group), 2 in prison (1 from the
intervention group, 1 from the control group), and 5 withdrawal (3 from the
intervention group, 2 from the control group; see Table 1 for the pattern of
attrition). Among the remaining 95 participants (50 from the intervention group,
45 from the control group), 78 participants, now in their 40s, took part in the
current study (participation rate: 82%). Among them, 42 received the standard
intervention and the extra educational intervention (ABC Intervention group)
while 36 were in the control group during early childhood (ABC Control group)
and only received the standard intervention. Several midlife demographic infor-
mation were also assessed as part of this stage of the ABC project using various self-
reported questionnaires (see Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary Note 5 for
midlife demographicinformation).
Additionally, 252 adult participants in Roanoke, Virginia also took part in this
study. These participants did not receive any controlled intervention during their
childhood (Roanoke Control group).
All participants gave written consent to participate in the experiments, and all
procedures were performed in accordance with the Institutional Review Board of
the Virginia Tech Carillion Research Institute. Data about gender and age are
presented in Supplementary Table 5.
Task procedure. Participants’ social behaviors were assessed using the UG and
MRT. Stimuli were presented and responses were collected using NEMO (Human
Neuroimaging Laboratory, Virginia Tech Carilion Research Institute). The order of
the two games was randomized across participants. Details for non-deception and
incentivization in the two games are provided in Supplementary Note 6.
In the UG, one player (Proposer) has to decide how to split a $20 endowment
between himself and another player (Responder). The Responder has to decide
whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both players get the
proposed amounts. However, if the offer is rejected, both players get $0.
Participants played 60 rounds as the Responder and were informed that the offers
in each round were from different proposers. Abecedarian participants and
Roanoke participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditioning type: the
medium-high-medium type (MHM) and the medium-low-medium type (MLM)
(17 in MLM and 25 in MHM for ABC Interventions; 21 in MLM and 15 in MHM
for ABC Controls; 122 in MLM and 130 in MHM for Roanoke Controls). During
the ﬁrst 20 rounds, participants assigned to both types received offers taken from
the Medium distribution (Mean= $8, SD= $1.5). During the next 20 rounds,
participants assigned to the MHM type received offers from the High distribution
(Mean= $12, SD= $1.5) while those assigned to MLM type received offers taken
from the Low distribution (Mean= $4, SD= $1.5). For the last 20 rounds,
participants from both types received offers from the Medium distribution
(Fig. 1a). In three of ﬁve rounds after having made their decisions, participants
were also asked to rate their emotion towards the current offer on a 1–9 scale,
ranging from unhappy to happy using emoticons adapted from the self-assessment
manikin42. Participants were informed that they would be paid according to
outcomes in one randomly selected round and were encouraged to treat each
round as the selected round. The timeline of one round of the UG is illustrated in
Supplementary Fig. 3a.
In the MRT, in each round, one player (Investor) received $20 and had to
choose to invest any portion of it. This amount of money was tripled and sent to
the other player (Trustee) who decided how much of it to repay the Investor. Each
participant played 10 consecutive rounds as the Investor in the MRT with the same
partner. Unknown to the participants, the Trustee’s responses in the MRT were
generated using a k-nearest neighbors sampling algorithm on known responses
from real players as described in ref. 14. The timeline of one round of the MRT is
illustrated in Supplementary Fig. 3b.
Statistics. Statistics were implemented using SPSS software (IBM SPSS Statistics
Version 21.0, IBM Corp.). For all analyses, the signiﬁcance level was set at 0.05 and
Greenhouse–Geisser correction non-sphericity was used when appropriate. Post
hoc comparisons were evaluated using two-tailed pairwise tests with Bonferroni
correction. Partial eta-squared (η2p) values were provided to demonstrate effect size
where appropriate43.
Rejection rate and emotion rating in UG. Our analyses focus on the participants’
social behavior towards inequality. Speciﬁcally, we tested the interaction between
equality and treatment on rejection rate by a (3 × 3) Group (ABC Intervention vs.
ABC Control vs. Roanoke Control) × Equality (Disadvantageous Unequal (offers <
10) vs. Equal (offers= 10) vs. Advantageous Unequal (offers > 10)) analyses of
covariance (ANCOVA) with Gender as the covariate in the MHM type to take
account of the gender unbalance within MHM type. As offers higher than $10 were
rarely displayed for in the MLM type, a (3 × 2) Group (ABC Intervention vs. ABC
Control vs. Roanoke Control) × Equality (Disadvantageous Unequal (offers < 10)
vs. Equal (offers= 10)) ANCOVA with Gender as the covariate was used for the
MLM type. Gender was included as a covariate in the analyses to control for the
difference in gender composition in the three groups.
Further, the rejection rates for each offer were calculated for each participant—
making it possible to precisely describe social behavior from highly
disadvantageous, to highly advantageous inequality. Because of the different
distribution of offers between MHM and MLM (Fig. 2a and Supplementary Fig. 1a)
resulting in small number of offers for certain amounts depending on the
conditioning type, different offer sizes were evaluated for MHM and MLM. For
each participant with MHM type, offers lower than $8 and offers higher than $12
were respectively pooled together. For each participant with MLM type, offers
lower than $5 were pooled together and offers higher than $10—rarely displayed—
were not included into the behavioral data analysis in MLM type. For each
conditioning type, differences in rejection rates were analyzed using a (3 × 7)
Group × Offer Size ANCOVA with Gender as the covariate to take account of the
gender unbalance within MLM type.
Differences in emotion ratings were analyzed using a similar approach: a
Group × Equality ANCOVA and an Offer Size × Group ANCOVA with Gender as
the covariate for each type of conditioning.
Model-based analyses for behaviors in UG. We assumed that the participants’
behavior could be modeled by their aversion to offers that deviate from equality
and ﬁtted each participant’s behaviors to a Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion
model (FS model)17. As previous studies using the UG have shown that people
have internal norms (expectations on money allocation) which can be updated
based on the history of offers16,44,45, we also ﬁtted the behavioral data to two types
of adaptation models, a Bayesian observer model44 and a Rescorla–Wagner
model33,46 to test if they outperformed the FS model.
In the FS inequality aversion model, the utility of each offer at each round was
represented by the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion utility function.
UðsiÞ ¼ si  αmax 10 si; 0f g  β maxfsi  10; 0g: ð1Þ
Here, U(si) represents the utility of the offer si at round i. This value is discounted
by the difference between the amount allocated (offer) to the Responder (si) and an
even split ($10). The disutility associated with inequality is controlled by two
parameters: α or “envy” (α∈[0,10]) which represents the participant’s
unwillingness of the participant to accept unequal offers disadvantageous to him/
her; β or “guilt” (β∈[0,10]) which represents his/her unwillingness to accept
unequal offers advantageous to him/her.
The probability of accepting each offer was modeled using a softmax function:
paccept ¼
euγ
1þ euγ : ð2Þ
Here, γ is the softmax inverse temperature parameter where the lower γ is, the
more diffuse and variable the choices are (γ∈[0,1]).
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Under the Bayesian observer model44 (BO model), we assumed that each
participant believed that the offers were sampled from a Gaussian distribution with
uncertain mean and variance, and performed Bayesian update after receiving a new
offer. Speciﬁcally, each participant was assumed to have a prior on the distribution
of the offers (s), with mean μ and variance σ2, denoted as s~N(μ,σ2). Since μ and
variance σ2 were mixed together, the prior of offers (s) was assumed as p(μ,σ2). The
prior was updated following Bayes’ rule once the participant received a new offer.
The posterior was given by
pðμ σ2jsiÞ ¼
pðsjμ; σ2Þpðμjσ2Þ
pðsiÞ
: ð3Þ
For convenience we assumed a conjugate prior of μ and σ2:
pðμ; σ2Þ ¼ pðμ; jσ2Þ pðσ2Þ; ð4Þ
with
pðμjσ2Þ ¼ Normalðμ^; σ^2=kÞ ð5Þ
pðσ2Þ ¼ Inv  χ2ðν; σ^2Þ: ð6Þ
We set the initial value of the hyperparameters k, ν and σ^2 as
k0 ¼ 4; ν0 ¼ 10; σ^20 ¼ 4
Two variations of the BO models were tested. The ﬁrst assumed equality as a ﬁxed
initial norm for all participants, μ^0 ¼ 10. The second assumed that the initial norm
could vary between participants, hence μ^0 was individually ﬁtted using each
participant’s responses (μ^0 2 0; 20½ ).
After receiving si, at round i, these values were updated as
ki ¼ ki1 þ 1; vi ¼ vi1 þ 1; ð7Þ
μ^i ¼ μ^i1 þ
1
ki
ðsi  μ^i1Þ; ð8Þ
νiσ^
2
i ¼ νi1σ^2i1 þ
ki1
ki
ðsi  μ^i1Þ2: ð9Þ
We deﬁne the prevailing norm as μi−1 at round i, and the utility of the offer is given
by
UðsiÞ ¼ si  αmax μi1  si; 0
  β maxfsi  μi1; 0g: ð10Þ
Here, α represents the unwillingness of the participant to accept offers lower than
his/her norm (α∈[0,10]). β represents the unwillingness to accept offers higher
than him/her norm (β∈[0,10]).
The probability of accepting each offer was
paccept ¼
euγ
1þ euγ ; ð2Þ
where γ∈[0,1].
The Rescorla–Wagner (RW) model assumed that each participant had internal
norms which were updated by the RW rule:33,46
xi ¼ xi1 þ εðsi  xi1Þ: ð11Þ
Here xi represents the norm at round i and ε is the norm adaptation rate
(ε∈[0,1]), which represents the extent to which the norm was inﬂuenced by the
difference (i.e., norm prediction error) between the current offer si and the
preceding norm xi−1. A low ε indicates a lower impact of the norm prediction error
on norm updating whereas a high ε indicates a high impact. Similar to the BO
model, two variations of the RW model were tested based on the initial norm x0: a
ﬁxed initial norm based on equality (x0 = 10) and variable initial norms across
participants. The utility of an offer at round i is given by
UðsiÞ ¼ si  αmax xi1  si; 0f g  βmaxfsi  xi1; 0g: ð12Þ
Similar to BO model, α here represents the unwillingness of the participant to
accept offers lower than his/her norms (α∈[0,10]). β represents the unwillingness
to accept offers higher than him/her norms (β∈[0,10]).
The probability of accepting each offer was
paccept ¼
euγ
1þ euγ ; ð2Þ
where γ∈[0,1].
All models were then ﬁtted to the behavioral data individually, which estimated
the values of α, β, γ, and μ^0 or x0 for variable starting norm models for each subject
by maximizing the log likelihood of choices over 60 trials. Then model comparison
was implemented by calculating the Bayesian information criterion score (BIC) for
each model for each participant. The model with the lowest mean BIC is
considered the winning model since it has the maximal model evidence
(Supplementary Table 4). The estimated parameters from the winning model were
compared among the three groups of participants with an ANCOVA with Gender
as a covariate. Post hoc comparisons were evaluated using Bonferroni correction.
The ranges of the free parameters in models presented above were based on
previous work44. We tested other ranges that resulted in slightly worse model
ﬁtting and did not signiﬁcantly affect the results presented here.
Fractional investment in MRT. The fractional investment sent from the partici-
pant (Investor) in each round was calculated as the amount of investment in each
round divided by the resource available to the investor in the current round (i.e.,
$20). The group difference on the average of investment across 10 rounds was
tested with a one-way analysis of variance.
Total earning in MRT. The earning of the participant (Investor) in each round was
calculated as the amount from the $20 kept by the Investor plus the amount of
repayment sent from the Trustee. The group difference on the sum of earnings
across 10 rounds was tested with a one-way analysis of variance.
Model-based analyses for behaviors in MRT. The foundation of players’ payoff
assessment was also based on the Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion model17, but
the envy term of the equation was omitted for the MRT. To distinguish the guilt
parameter in the MRT from the one in the UG, the guilt parameter in the MRT is
called inequality aversion, which quantiﬁes the tendency to try and reach a fair
outcome with values of {0, 0.4, 1}.
This model of MRT includes six other parameters: (1) planning horizon, which
quantiﬁes number of steps to likely plan ahead with values of {1, 2, 3, 4}; (2) theory
of mind (ToM), which quantiﬁes the number of mentalization steps with values of
{0, 2, 4}; (3) inverse temperature, which quantiﬁes the randomness of the choice
preference with values of {1/4, 1/3, 1/2, 1}; (4) risk aversion, which quantiﬁes the
value of money kept over money potentially gained with values of {0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0,
1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8}; (5) irritability, which quantiﬁes tendency to retaliate on
repayments worse than expected with values of {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}; and (6)
irritability Belief, which quantiﬁes the initial belief of likelihood of the partner
being irritable with values of {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The values for the parameters were
selected based on previous work23. The whole collection of parameters that best
characterize an individual player are determined by maximizing the likelihood of
their choices (over a grid of possible values). See ref. 23 for a detailed description of
the model. Since these seven parameters from the model were ordinal variables, the
tests of group effects for each parameter were conducted with independent-samples
Kruskal–Wallis H tests. Post hoc comparisons were evaluated using two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U-tests with Bonferroni correction.
Code availability. The code used to analyze data in the current study is available
from the corresponding author on request.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The datasets generated and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the
corresponding author on request. A reporting summary for this article is available as
a Supplementary Information.
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